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federal courts should adopt the independent application of this testm
which enables a more realistic evaluation of the taxpayer's motives
and the statutory intent in determining the deductibility of interest.
WILLIAm

H. THomPsoN

Torts-Medical Malpractice-Rejection of "But for" Test
In Hicks v. United States' a navy doctor failed to test for bowel
obstruction in a patient who complained of severe abdominal pains.
The patient, treated only for a "bug," died some eight hours later,
suffering from a strangulation of the intestine. On the basis of
expert testimony, the doctor was found to have been negligent in
failing to diagnose the obstruction. There was also testimony that
if a correct diagnosis had been made, an immediate operation would
have saved the patient's life. Testimony apparently was not given
to indicate whether an immediate operation could have been performed or to indicate what dangers such an operation would have
involved, if any.' On the basis of this testimony the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the trial judge was compelled
to find negligence and "cause in fact" and to award a verdict to the
plaintiff. The evidence of cause in fact is probably sufficient to meet
the orthodox tests, but the court apparently rejected the usual test
of cause in fact, saying that
When a defendant's negligent action or inaction has effectively
terminated a person's chance of survival, it does not lie in the
defendant's mouth to raise conjectures as to the measure of the
chances that he has put beyond the possibility of realization. If
there was any substantial possibility of survival and the defendant
has destroyed it, he is answerable.'
" The close family relationship will continue to pose a problem if it
appears the taxpayer was "borrowing" his own money. In this situation
the realities of a loan obligation may not be present.
1368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
The patient suffered from diabetes as well as from an "abnormal congenital peritoneal hiatus with internal herniation. . . ." Id. at 629. It seems
doubtful that a layman could estimate the likelihood or non-likelihood of
the patient's survival under these conditions, especially without knowing
whether qualified personnel were on hand to operate. Compare George v.
City of New York, 253 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1964) where a barium
enema penetrated the bowel wall; an operation was immediately performed,
but the patient died. Nevertheless, the testimony in Hicks that an operation
would probably have been successful is no doubt sufficient evidence of cause.
3368 F.2d at 632.
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This test evidently means that the defendant is liable, not only if his
negligence in fact caused the injury suffered, but also if his negligence eliminated some "substantial" "chance" the plaintiff might
have had of escaping injury even where actual causation cannot be
shown.4
It is usually said that to hold a defendant liable for his negligence,
a plaintiff must prove that the negligence was a "cause-in-fact" of
the harm.5 This cause-in-fact requirement is established when the
plaintiff shows that, "but for" the defendant's negligent act the
plaintiff would not have been injured.' If, on the other hand, the
plaintiff would have been injured even without the defendant's negligent conduct, it is said that the negligence is not a cause-in-fact
of the harm and the plaintiff may not recover. The "orthodox"
view is that the plaintiff must prove facts showing causation, just
as he must prove the other elements of his case, by a greater weight
of the evidence. As with other matters of proof, this means that
he must prove facts showing "but for" causation is more likely than
not. 7 Courts sometimes depart from this orthodox view and hold
that "causation" is sufficiently established if it is shown that defendant's negligence may have caused harm-that is, if the defendant's negligence reduced plaintiff's chances of escaping an
injury.' This is the kind of view applied in Hicks to medical mal'Even a "substantial" chance may be less than a likely chance. A 10%
chance may be "substantial," though it falls far short of any likelihood. The
defendant has terminated the chance, whatever it is, and that seems to be
enough under the court's test, so long as the chance is "substantial." The
orthodox "but-for" test requires more than the termination of a ten percent
or even a forty per cent chance; it requires a likelihood that the plaintiff
would have avoided injury "but for" the defendant's negligence. This
orthodox rule is sometimes abandoned; but there is, perhaps, a tendency to
stay with it in malpractice cases. See Malone, Ruminations on Cause-inFact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60, 87, n.66 (1956).
' See, e.g., Waugh v. Suburban Club Ginger Ale Co., 83 App. D.C. 226,
167 F.2d 758 (1948); RESTATEmENT (SEcOND), TORTs §§ 281, 431, 432
(1965).
'RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), ToRTs § 432 (1965); PRossnR, ToRTs 242
(3d ed. 1964).
" See Bockman v. Butler, 224 Ark. 125, 271 S.W.2d 918 (1954) (recognizing that probability "will suffice," but holding that no one should mention
this to the jury); Silvers v. Wesson, 122 Cal. App. 902, 266 P.2d 169

(1954).
' The Fourth Circuit had earlier applied this view in a case not involv-

ing malpractice; Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284,
91 A.L.R.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963). On
this point generally, see Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN.
L. Rzv. 60 (1956).
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practice cases, although it is probably correct, as Professor Wex
Malone has supposed, that the plaintiff in medical malpractice cases
"must usually establish the causal probabilities beyond peradventure."9 Certainly there are decisions that clearly reject the very
liberal view in Hicks,' though perhaps there are other malpractice
cases that at least do not require "certainty."'"
The "but for" test of cause-in-fact, plus the traditional rule that

puts upon the plaintiff the burden of proving this cause, has many
potentialities for injustice. As a result, courts have more or less
admittedly done away with the cause-in-fact requirement-or at
least with the "but for" test-in several lines of cases. These are
primarily cases involving two or more wrongdoers or at least two
or more "causes" of the plaintiff's harm.
One line of such cases is quite familiar: two drivers of automobiles are negligent and together cause a collision in which plaintiff
is injured. Even if the acts of negligence are separated in time, the
drivers may be called "concurrent torifeasors" in many cases and
they will be held liable together for the plaintiff's injuries, at least
if those injuries are not separable and capable of being attributed
in a certain part to each wrongdoer.' 2 In such cases it is clear enough
that one of the wrongdoers may be paying for injury he did not
"cause" in fact under the "but for" test. A second line of cases
9

Id. at 86.

" Silvers v. Wesson, 122 Cal. App. 902, 266 P.2d 169 (1954): "It may
well be that the chances of a patient's living longer... might, by early observation and treatment, be increased from ten percent to forty percent.
But that is certainly not proof that such early observation and treatment
would probably result in curing a cancer. . .

."

In this case the doctor

negligently (it is assumed) failed to examine cystoscopically, and accordingly did not discover a bladder tumor for two years. The court denied
recovery on the ground that, even if the doctor had examined earlier, the
cancer might have been incurable by that time anyway. Harries v. United
States, 350 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1965) (must be probability or better formula,
as in Silvers case). Sturm v. Green, 398 P.2d 799 (Okla. 1965) (no tests
made, but no evidence whether they would have revealed deficiency, therefore failure to give tests is not shown to be causal of patient's death; court
also11held "no negligence.")
E.g., Price v. Neyland, 115 App. D.C. 355, 320 F.2d 674, 99 A.L.R.2d
1391 (1963); Walden v. Jones, 289 Ky. 395, 158 S.W.2d 609, 141 A.L.R.
105 (1942).
Watts v. Smith, 375 Mich. 120, 134 N.W.2d 194 (1965), 44 N.C.L.
REv. 249 (1965). The argument is largely gaged in terms of what injuries
are "indivisible." See Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d
33 (1961). But see Caygill v. Ipsen, 27 Wis. 2d 578, 135 N.W.2d 284
(1965) (no joinder of defendants allowed where plaintiff alleged accidents
five months apart in separate counties.)
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is similar, but goes further. In the second line two defendants are
negligent, and the plaintiff is injured as the result of the negligence
of one of them, but no one is able to say which. For example, two
hunters fire shotguns in the direction of the plaintiff. A pellet from
one of the guns strikes the plaintiff. Both defendants are held
liable, 8 though clearly enough one of them is not causal of any harm
at all to the physical person of the plaintiff. A third line of cases
may go even further. A fire is set by lightning and without negligence; if allowed to burn, it will (probably) harm the plaintiff's
home. Another fire is negligently set by defendant. It combines with
the first fire and the combined fire burns plaintiff's home. Under
some cases 14 at least, defendant will apparently be held liable, even
though the plaintiff would have suffered the same harm anyway.
In cases like the shotgun-firing cases, each defendant is either the
cause of the harm or the cause of obscuring the facts about causation.
If both A and B fire, one of them hit the plaintiff and should be
liable for that reason; the other, by firing, has made it impossible
for us to know which fired the pellet that caused the harm. For
this reason we feel justified in holding both liable.' 5 Similar feelings
prevail in the multiple automobile collision situation. The fire
situation, however, goes further, where one fire is not set by anyone's fault. In such a situation, defendant's conduct in setting the
fire is not causal under the "but for" test nor does it obscure the
liability of anyone else, as in the hunter cases. These cases, then,
reflect a certain amount of judicial agreement that at least in some
circumstances cause in fact or "but for" is not an element to be insisted upon.
In other kinds of cases, however, where there is only one alleged
cause of the plaintiff's harm, the results are mixed. There are cases
in which courts have, in one way or another, eliminated the cause1
in-fact requirement altogether, either by ignoring the problem " or
by so enlarging the defendant's duty that he is liable if he causes
-1Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (a leading case,
used in some cases.)
rejecting the "concert of action"St.theory
P. & S. St. M.Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179
•Anderson v. Minneapolis,
N.W. 45 (1920).
1- See PROSSER, TORTS 243 n.24 (3d ed. 1964), and cases cited note 16
infra.
where
10 See Rice v. Norfolk So. R.R., 167 N.C. 1, 82 S.E. 1034 (1914),
defendant negligently allowed drains to stop up; this created a pond. Later
plaintiff, who lived in the vicinity, got malaria. A recovery was allowed.
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the plaintiff to lose the "chance" of escaping injury or death.17
Thus, for example, if the master of a ship does not make a reasonable effort to find the seaman who has fallen overboard, the master
is liable, even though it is not at all probable that the seaman could
be saved. In such a case, the defendant has a duty to use care to
increase the seaman's chances, and it is enough for liability that the
defendant's negligence is a cause-in-fact of the seaman's loss of a
chance.'
On the other hand, there are many cases in which courts have
been over-insistent upon proof of cause-in-fact. An establishment
dealing with radioactive material negligently fails to provide its
employees sufficient protection and they get cancer, but recovery may
be denied because the employee has no means of proving causation.' 9
Or the defendant sprays a tobacco crop from the air, and witnesses
see a substance falling from the airplane over plaintiff's commercial
fish ponds; later the fish jump and then die; but recovery is denied
because causation is not proved by these facts.2" Or the defendant
negligently stores flammables and a fire breaks out nearby and
spreads to the plaintiff's premises; but recovery is denied because
causation is not proved by these facts.2 ' Or defendant's defective
machine spouts oil in plaintiff's eye, which burns and within 24
hours gets much worse; but recovery is denied because causation
is not proved by these facts. 22 Some of these cases, at least, evince
2
an impossibly strict notion of the value of circumstantial evidence. "
"Malone, Ruminations on Catse-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. Rlv. 60 (1956)
is an excellent discussion.
1" Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, 310 F.2d 284, 91 A.L.R.2d 1023
(1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963).
" Mahoney v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), aff'd,
339 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1964).
"0Wall v. Trogdon, 249 N.C. 747, 107 S.E.2d 757 (1959); cf. Western
Geophysical Co. v. Martin, 253 Miss. 14, 174 So. 2d 706 (1965) (well
suddenly contaminated after underground blasts, cause not proved).
Inferences might be drawn against plaintiff on the causal issue if he
does not produce all the evidence he has. In Western Geophysical, supra,
the plaintiff did not examine the pump in his well. This clearly aided the
court in holding against him. The court said, "This inference [of causation] is unnecessary because if the shot did cause the damage the [plaintiff]
could have offered more direct proof...." Id. at 31, 194 So. 2d at 715.
21 Maharias v. Weathers Bros. Moving & Storage, 257 N.C. 767, 127
S.E.2d 548 (1962); a slight shift in the plaintiff's emphasis may get a
different result: Chicago, M.S.P. & P.R.R. v. Poarch, 292 F.2d 449 (9th
Cir. 1961).
"Reason v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 259 N.C. 264, 130 S.E.2d 397
(1963).
2 See the language of the Hicks case itself on this point, supra note 4
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Apart from such objections to these restrictive cases, however, it
may be said that where the defendant's negligence has created a
risk of the harm that in fact came about, and where the negligence
obscures relevant evidence about causation, all doubts ought to be
resolved against the negligent defendant, just as in the case of the
two hunters.
Another reason for allowing recovery in some of these cases is
that the "but for" test itself does not make a great deal of sense.
The "but for" test asks us to determine the "fact" of causation by
asking us to speculate about what would have happened if the defendant had not been negligent. If the defendant had not splashed
hot lead upon the plaintiff, would plaintiff have contracted cancer ?24
If the defendant had not neglected to provide a life guard at a
swimming pool, would the plaintiff's decedent have drowned?25
In neither case can a "factual" answer be given; we can only speculate about what might have been, and there is no way to verify our
guesses. We might as well ask what an elephant would have been
if it had not been an elephant. Surely this is a kind of question that
is unrewarding for a practical profession.
The speculative and sometimes misleading character of the
"but for" test may be quickly illustrated. Suppose defendant owns
a partly rotted tree, dangerous because it is likely to fall of its own
and accompanying text, and the similar views expressed by Judge Sobeloff

in Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963). Where there are two tortfeasors or
combined forces causing a single harm, this reasoning, or something like it,
seems well accepted. See notes 12-14 supra. A less radical view would not
resolve all doubts against the wrongdoer, but would do so only in situations

where some policy about the wrongdoer's duty would dictate. Cf. Malone,

Ruminations and Cause-in-Fact,9 STAN. L. REv. 60 (1956).
Post hoc ergo propter hoc is, of course, fallacious, if we speak in absolute terms. But in practical affairs, like law, we speak in terms of probabilities, or even a good guess about probabilities. And we prove cause-infact by showing facts that will allow reasonable men to guess about probabilities; certainty is not required.
",Kramer Service, Inc., v. Wilkins, 184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 625 (1939)
(blow on the head; skin cancer at point of blow, causation not established).
Smith v. Leech Brain & Co., [1962] Weekly L.R. 148 (Q.B.) (causation
established).
" Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Bailey, 107 Ga. App. 417, 130 S.E.2d
242 (1963) (causation established); Justice v. Prescott, 258 N.C. 781,
129 S.E.2d 479 (1963) (causation not established, semble). Of course,

if the question is the orthodox "but for" question, the variation in facts in

various cases may justify a difference in results, since circumstantial evi-

dence will be strong enough in some cases to justify a good guess about
"but for" causation and not strong enough in others. The point here, however, is that it is necessarily a guess.
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weight upon a passerby. It does fall on a passerby, but because it
was blown down by an unforeseeable wind, a wind so strong that
it would have blown down even a sound tree. The defendant is
negligent, and the unforeseeability of the wind will not properly
affect his liability, since the result itself-injury to the passerbywas foreseeable.2" The "but for" test, however, tempts one to say
that there is no cause-in-fact; even a carefully braced tree might
have blown over in the strong wind. Yet we do not know that the
tree would have been braced if defendant had not been negligent;
it might have been chopped down." If we assume that, if defendant
had not been negligent, he would have braced the tree, the injury
would have occurred anyway, and the negligence in not bracing the
tree is not a cause-in-fact. But we assume that defendant would have
chopped the tree down had he not been negligent, then clearly his
failure to do so is a cause in fact of the harm, for the harm would
not have occurred if no tree was there. There seems little negligencelaw policy in favor of either assumption about what might have
happened without defendant's negligence.2" Thus the "but for" test
seems to take us into speculation and metaphysics.
A more ordinary case may make the same point. In a wellknown case,2" the defendant stopped his truck at a light and when the
light changed made a right turn. He did not signal the turn and he
ran into a boy who had pulled up between the right side of the truck
and the curb, evidently because the boy was not expecting the truck
to turn right. Judge Edgerton-a great judge-said that defendant's
failure to give a turn signal was not a "but for" cause, since there
The defendant may be held even though he does not foresee "the particular injury precisely as in fact it occurred." Boone v. North Carolina
R.R., 240 N.C. 152, 81 S.E.2d 380 (1954). And one is sometimes held
liable where an act of God strikes. See Harris v. Norfolk S.R.R., 173 N.C.
110, 91 S.E. 710 (1917). And see Lawrence v. Yadkin River Power Co.,
190 N.C. 664, 130 S.E. 735 (1925).
2 Dean Page Keeton of the University of Texas School of Law used
this illustration for a similar point at the Torts Roundtable of the Association of American Law Schools, December 1962.
28 It can be argued that one should assume either a minimum change of
conduct that would qualify as non-negligent or any change in conduct that
would eliminate causation. Such assumptions would minimize the chance
that defendant's negligence is causal and would maximize his freedom of
conduct. This may be thought to be more consistent with negligence law
and the risk principle. But if so, we are into problems beyond practical
jury solution.
"Waugh v. Suburban Club Ginger Ale Co., 83 D.C. App. 226, 167 F.2d
758 (1948).
28

806

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.45

was no evidence that the boy, from a position to the right of the
truck, could have seen such a signal. Yet one cannot be sure that
a hand signal will not catch someone's eye, 80 or the noise of a light
signal will not catch an ear. To ask the plaintiff, injured in a way
defendant risked, to "prove" such a matter is to ask the impossible.
Perhaps one might feel that the problems in Hicks should not be
solved by adverting to causation doctrines at all, but that they should
be solved instead by considering the defendant's duty."' It might be
said, for example, that the defendant doctor is under a duty to use
care to maximize the patient's chances of survival. If this formula
is used, it is clear that defendant's negligence caused the loss of something to which the patient was entitled-maximum chances. He
may or may not have "caused" the loss of the patient's life, but he
certainly caused the loss of some of the chances at keeping it. At
least in some areas of tort law, this approach seems to have been
followed. 2
Clearly enough, the rule stated in Hicks rejects the orthodox
"but for" test, and substitutes in the malpractice situation a liberal
approach already applied in a few other situations. The defendant
is held, not only if he caused the death or injury, but also if he
caused the loss of plaintiff's chance of escaping death or injury. Presumably this rule applied only when the defendant is shown to have
been negligent and to have created a risk of the kind of injury that
in fact did occur. The effect of Hicks is likely to be great, although
it is difficult to be sure, since the cause problem is so often ignored.
In any event the decision seems sound. It might be argued that it
is inappropriate to extend a liberalization into the medical malpractice
field ;83 but this seems wrong. Physicians are already highly insulated
from their negligence by the rule that they are liable only when their
See also Rouleau v. Blotner, 84 N.H. 539, 152 Atl. 916 (1931).
See Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MicH.
L. REv. 543 (1962), reprinted in GREN, TuE LiTiGATiON PRocEss in TORT
LAw, 249 (1965).
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 324, and comment g (1965).
The comment indicates that if one gratuitously rescues another from a
trench filled with poisonous gas, he cannot return him to the trench, thus
"worsening" the victim's position. The duty, once undertaken, is not to
worsen the position, even though it is clear that defendant's acts have not
"caused" any loss to the plaintiff he would not have suffered anyway. See
also Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963).
" See Malone, Runinations on Cause-in-Fact,9 STAN. L. REv. 60, 85-88
(1956).
'o
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colleagues testify against them."
important and desirable step.
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Thus, Hicks seems to be an
DAN B. DoBBs*

8'This is the rule for most cases, see PROSSER, TORTS § 32 (3d ed. 1964).
In a few cases res ipsa loquitur will apply, e.g. Beaudoin v. Watertown
Mem. Hosp., 32 Wis. 2d 132, 145 N.W.2d 166 (1966) (vaginal operation,
patient woke to find blisters on her buttocks).
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.

